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Identity Management has been a serious problem since the establishment of the Internet. Yet little progress has 
been made toward an acceptable solution. Early Identity Management Systems (IdMS) were designed to control 
access to resources and match capabilities with people in well-defined situations, Today’s computing environment 
involves a variety of user and machine centric forms of digital identities and fuzzy organizational boundaries. With 
the advent of inter-organizational systems, social networks, e-commerce, m-commerce, service oriented computing, 
and automated agents, the characteristics of IdMS face a large number of technical and social challenges. The first 
part of the tutorial describes the history and conceptualization of IdMS, current trends and proposed paradigms, 
identity lifecycle, implementation challenges and social issues. The second part addresses standards, industry initia-
tives, and vendor solutions. We conclude that there is disconnect between the need for a universal, seamless, trans-
parent IdMS and current proposed standards and vendor solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The word identity dates back to 1570
1
 and is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as ―the distinguishing 
character or personality of an individual.‖ Dictionary.com offers a broader definition: ―the condition of being oneself 
or itself, and not another.‖
2
 By adding the word itself, the definition includes persons and objects. Both definitions 
highlight the fact that an identity is used to separate one entity from all others. Wikipedia defines digital identity as 
―the digital representation of a set of claims made by one digital subject about it or another digital subject.‖
3
 A digital 
subject may be human using a digital device (computer, PDA, mobile phone) or nonhuman, such as devices and 
computers requesting services of one another. Thus: 
A digital identity represents a set of unique, distinguishing digital characteristics or claims that 
could establish the identity of the subject, that is, ensures that the subject is who or what it claims 
to be. 
In the physical world, humans use a number of identifying tools: 
1. Things they know, such as their name, address, age, social security number, or items that are verifiable 
against physical records such as a social security card, a driver license, or a passport 
2. Things they carry, such as an idcard or a credit card 
3. Things they are, such as their height, weight, and hair and eye color 
During a transaction between two subjects, one uses their five senses to verify the claims of the other (e.g., visual, 
audio). Therefore, when a customer purchases a product at a physical store, the clerk can visually verify the credit 
card, compare the signature, and often the picture id-card. This ability to use our trusted senses to verify the claims 
of a subject creates trust between the two transacting entities.
4
 In cyber space, as stated by Peter Steiners’s 
cartoon, ―... nobody knows you’re a dog‖ [Steiner 1993]. Thus, digital identities deal with the complexities of 
replacing simple human abilities with complex systems that attempt to mimic human intuition. One of the key issues 
facing society is that, with the advent of the Internet, we are more dependent on eLife
5
; functions that as recent as 
ten to fifteen years ago were completed in the physical space now occur in cyber space (e.g., commerce, financial, 
government transactions, communication). However, rather than develop separate logical identities for cyberspace, 
our ―physical identities‖ became a de facto standard for our digital identities. That is, most websites require 
identifying elements that we traditionally use in the physical world, such as name, credit card numbers, address, and 
phone number. This state of affairs introduces two major challenges: 
1. Security. Computers and networks are susceptible to hacking. Once hackers obtain a digital identity they can 
use it in the physical world, resulting in identity theft. 
2. Privacy. The ability to map one’s digital identity to a physical identity creates major privacy concerns. This is 
especially true due to the large number of databases containing private information such as health care, 
financial, and marketing. 
In the early 2000s, industry, governments, policymakers, and casual computer users became aware of the risk 
involved in the use of physical identity components in cyber space. Awareness led to attempts to develop standards, 
frameworks, and implementations of IdM systems in which digital entities are provisioned based on strong technical 
authentication tools. These topics are discussed in the following sections. 
                                                     
1. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
2. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/identity  (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_identity  (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
4. Even here, fake and/or forged identities can be used by people trying to outwit the other party. 
5. eLife refers to portions of our lives that occur in cyber space from communicating with others (e.g., e-mail) to commerce, entertainment 
(internet TV), and web 2.0. 
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II. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CYBER IDENTITY 
Although the concept of a digital identity is not new, the terminology used to describe it and its association to Identity 
Management is not well defined. The discussion in this section is mostly drawn from a document maintained by 
Pfitzmann and Hansen [2006] last revised in May 2006. The basic assumption of this discussion is that 
communication among entities or subjects is done by sending and receiving messages over a communications 
network. This assumption is in line with most client/server, Internet, or SOA architectures, and thus we feel that it is 
not unreasonable. In addition, we assume that some level of anonymity is a desired state for senders and receivers. 
Anonymity is defined as the inability to identify an entity. Anonymity ensures that a user may use a resource without 
disclosing its own identity. Anonymity also assumes that it is not possible to link a resource or a message to a 
particular sender (sender anonymity) or receiver (receiver anonymity), nor that a pair of sender/receiver is linked 
(relationship anonymity). Ultimate (or strong) anonymity may be a desirable state. However, full anonymity prevents 
useful communications. For example, if an anonymous sender sends a message requesting a web page, the 
receiver (web server in this case) must be able to link the request to an IP address, a domain name and a port 
number to reply, thus reducing anonymity. Therefore, Pfitzmann and Hansen [2006] introduce the term 
pseudonymity. As will become clear later, pseudonymity could be equated with digital identity. A pseudonym (or a 
nym) is an identifier of a subject (sender, receiver, entity), other than its real name. The holder of the pseudonym is 
the user (regardless if the pseudonym was chosen by the user or was randomly created by the system). A 
pseudonym may be linked to a single user or a group and can vary over time. The existence of a pseudonym does 
not guarantee anonymity. 
Authentication and Accountability6 
Unlike in the physical (face-to-face) world, in cyber space, identifying and authenticating are not synonymous. While 
identifying establishes the unique characteristics of a subject, authenticating verifies, or validates that identity. 
Therefore, authentication depends on the ability to link a pseudonym to an entity. This ability is important to achieve 
accountability. For example, a user-id and password establishes the identity of the subject using them. However, if a 
user discloses her user-id and password to a co-worker and the co-worker uses the identity to enter the system, the 
system identifies a subject but validates or authenticates the wrong identity. 
The need to verify the claims of a pseudonym introduces the concept of identity broker. Identity brokers are trusted 
third parties (other than the sender or receiver) that adhere to certain rules
7
 and maintain the link between the 
pseudonym and the identity of the user. Identity brokers reveal the linkage when and if necessary. The ability of 
identity brokers to link pseudonyms to actual identities is an essential component of accountability. To achieve 
accountability, it should be possible to authenticate and certify an entity. That is, the identity broker should certify the 
original identity of the pseudonym holder. The transfer of such authentication (or other attributes of an entity) by a 
third party is also termed credentials. The term credential is used often in the IdMS literature. In general, anonymity 
and accountability are two extremes of the privacy continuum. Anonymity (i.e., the inability to link a message to its 
source) ensures complete privacy, while accountability requires some level of disclosure. The concept of 
pseudonymity allows implementing a compromise solution between accountability and anonymity. To increase 
anonymity, a system might use a chain of identity brokers. 
Types of Pseudonyms 
Pseudonyms vary in their strength (i.e., their ability to hide the link to the ―real identity‖). For a public pseudonym, the 
link between the pseudonym and the holder are public knowledge (such as a phone number of a person or an IP 
address of a server). For an initial non-public pseudonym, the link between the pseudonym and the holder is 
accessible but not publicly known. Often identity certification authorities (or identity brokers) hold that information. In 
the case of an initially unlinked pseudonym, the link is (initially) unknown. For example, the link between biometric 
attribute and a given user (e.g., eye retina signature) is unknown, unless the user records it somewhere. 
Pseudonyms also vary depending on who holds them. A person’s pseudonym is a replacement for the person’s true 
identity (i.e., physical identity). A role pseudonym is limited to a specific role (such as a customer using an e-
commerce website). A person might have many roles (see Figure 5), and a role might be held by several persons. 
Pfitzmann and Hansen [2006] define a relationship pseudonym and a role-relationships pseudonym to denote the 
pseudonym used to communicate with a given partner and a given role. For example, a person might communicate 
with a website in her role as a vendor while at work and as a customer otherwise. Occasionally, systems create 
                                                     
6. Although Pfitzmann and Hansen do not assert that authentication is a requirement for a pseudonym’s link to a real identity, others do (for 
example, see Darmiani, De Capitani di Vimercati, and Samarati 2003). 
7. What is considered an ―acceptable set of rules‖ is a technical and social issue and will be discussed later. 
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transaction specific pseudonyms, which are only valid for the duration of a given transaction (e.g., fund transfer 
systems). A person’s pseudonym is considered the least anonymous while a transaction pseudonym is the most 
anonymous. 
An example of a mechanism to implement pseudonyms is PKI (public Key Infrastructure) where public key 
certificates and digital signatures are issued by certificate authorities to ensure the identity of a user while 
maintaining a ―reasonable‖ level of anonymity and accountability. 
Roles, Partial Identities, and Digital Identities 
In the context of identity management, the concept of an entity or subject can refer to a person, a machine, or a 
program. If one of the ultimate objectives of an IdMS is to maintain the privacy of an entity, it is logical to confine the 
discussion to human actors. Yet, most of the current literature defines entities in the global sense and only 
occasionally refers specifically to humans. An identity is defined as a set of attributes that uniquely identify an entity. 
Because an entity might have various roles, depending on the situation, the context and with whom they 
communicate, an entity is, therefore, likely to have a number of partial identities, each containing some of the 
attributes of the complete identity. A pseudonym is said to identify a partial identity. 
A digital identity is defined as (identifying) attributes that are accessible by technical means (i.e., that can be stored 
and retrieved by computer-based systems). For example, a digital identity may be an e-mail address or a user 
name. Although the term virtual identity appears in the literature, it is used most often in reference to virtual worlds 
(i.e., games) and rarely used in the context of IdMS. 
Identity Management, Privacy, Reputation 
Identity management refers to the process of managing partial identities and pseudonyms. It includes the design and 
administration of attributes and pseudonyms to be used. An identity management system enhances privacy if it limits 
the linkage between the pseudonym and the partial identity by selecting ―proper‖ attributes. Privacy-enhancing 
applications follow the ―need to know‖ rule, that is, messages between sender and receiver and the attributes of the 
pseudonyms used do not provide more linkage to the partial identity than is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the application. When re-using a partial identity, the user can build a reputation (positive or negative). For example, 
an e-mail address that is used repeatedly to send e-mail messages will find its way to the INBOX (i.e., good 
reputation); while an e-mail address from certain regions known for spam (based on country code) is likely to find its 
way to the SPAM box (i.e., bad reputation). Much like other systems, an identity management system does not need 
to be computer based. People often manage their partial identities and pseudonyms off-line (a phone book, a list of 
credit card numbers, PINs). In this tutorial, we refer to Identity Management Systems (IdMS) as computer-based 
systems that design and administer (partial) identities, pseudonyms, and their attributes. IdMS refer to the 
architecture required to support identity management applications, by which users manage their partial identities, 
communication, privacy, and security. A more detailed discussion of the characteristics of IdMS is presented in 
Sections V and VI. 
The goal of this paper is to describe some of the contemporary computer-based approaches to the management of 
digital identities given the above conceptualization of identity, anonymity, accountability, and privacy. We begin with 
a historical overview of digital access control and the challenges they present, followed by the characteristics of 
IdMS, technical and conceptual components of IdMS, technical challenges, social challenges, proposed standards 
and standardization organizations, and vendor implementations. 
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
In the early days of computing, computer systems were monolithic and relatively isolated from the external 
environment. During the mainframe era, accessibility was controlled by physical means. That is, computers were 
locked in specialized rooms, and access to data and information was limited to printouts and physical reports, and 
dumb terminals. Access control was a relatively simple mechanism, since all dumb terminals had to be connected to 
the processor (CPU) via a control unit (CU). This type of connection applied to local terminals (directly connected to 
the CU) or to remote terminals (connected via dial-up networks and modems). This architecture was based on a 
static port allocation. The CU identified terminals based on their physical location and address. Remote terminals 
could not connect directly to the processor and had to have a static callback phone number to be a legitimate user. 
Thus, users’ identification and privileges were based on the physical location/connection of the terminal they used. 
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For example, the initial version of IBM’s RACF (Resource Access Control Facility) authenticated terminals based on 
their physical address.
8
 
As multitasking increased and with the advent of local area networks (LAN), more granular and dynamic access 
control became necessary. The next phase was the implementation of the traditional user-id and password 
combination (also known as logical access control). Logical access controls rely on Access Control Lists (ACL) and 
one of three elements: 
1. What you know 
2. What you have 
3. What you are 
First Generation AC—What You Know 
The oldest, simplest, and cheapest form of access control relies on a key word, phrase, or combination of characters 
selected by the user and known only to the user. The system identifies the user based on the proper combination of 
an id, a password, and sometimes a pass phrase. The assumption is that a correct combination of these elements 
authenticates the user and provides her with proper privileges. However, first generation ACL suffers from the 
following limitations: 
1. Simple or short passwords are easy to break using brute force attacks or dictionary attacks (Table 1). Thus, 
users are required to create long (8 or more characters) and unintuitive passwords. 
2. To avoid possible attacks, passwords need to be replaced regularly, increasing users’ resistance and 
frustrations. 
3. Users are susceptible to social engineering and tend to share their user-id and passwords with co-workers, 
friends, and figures of authority [Cazier and Botelh 2007]. 
4. Most users have several user-ids and passwords creating a password overload syndrome.
9
 A study by RSA 
found that 28 percent of corporate workers juggle 13 or more passwords while 30 percent of workers rely on 
6 to 12 passwords.
10
 
5. As a result of password overload, users tend to: 
a. Select easy to remember passwords, which are easier to break 
b. Write their passwords and keep the notes in obvious locations such as under their keyboard, behind their 
screen or on their desk 
c. Record their passwords on their PDA, cell phones, or in a file on their desktop 
d. Require additional support from helpdesk personnel, increasing organizational costs. It is estimated that 
the cost to resolve a password problem by helpdesk personnel cost from $10 to $31 per inquiry [Kho 
2009] 
                                                     
  8. In 1976 IBM introduced RACF (Resource Access Control Facility) as an add-on layer to their mainframe operating system. RACF has been 
upgraded as IBM introduced new versions of its operating system and used as the main security component of IBM mainframes for the last 
30+ years (http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/mainframes/a_return_to_legacy_security_247?show=247.php&cat=mainframes). 
(last accessed 08/16/2009). 
  9. http://www.net-security.org/article.php?id=750 (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
10. http://www.informationweek.com/news/global-cio/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=171201187 (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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Table 1. Estimated Time to Break a Password. Adapted from Whitman and Mattord [2005] 
Number of Characters 
in Password 
Estimated time to Break—All Lower Case Estimated time to Break—Upper Case Used 
4 2.7 seconds 9.5 seconds 
5 3 minutes and 2 seconds 15 minutes, 17 seconds 
6 3 hours, 26 minutes 23 hours, 57 minutes, 14 seconds 
7 9 days, 17 hours, 26 minutes 3 months, 3 days, 19 hours 
8 1 year, 10 months, 1 day 24 years, 6 months 
Second Generation AC—What You Have 
As organizations began to implement client-server architecture, dynamic remote access, and Intranets and 
Extranets, the need for additional layers of secure accessibility became apparent. Security was especially important 
for the financial and health industries due to increasing privacy related regulations (e.g., HIPAA). Second Generation 
access control mechanisms incorporate an additional layer. The user is required to have a physical component (e.g., 
card, key, token) to gain access to the system. After the user enters her user-id and password, she will use the 
physical component to confirm her identity. Some systems use a key (much like a door key) while some systems 
use synchronized tokens (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. An Access Control Token
11
 
 
Second Generation access control alleviate some of the issues discussed above. For example, if hackers break the 
user-id and password, they cannot gain access to the system unless they can access the ―token.‖ Remote social 
engineering is also impossible. User-ids and passwords could be replaced less often, since today’s advanced tokens 
are dynamic and provide the added security necessary. However, other issues (overload, using familiar words, 
recording the passwords) remain a challenge for security managers. More so, internal sharing and internal social 
engineering continue to be a problem, since users who share passwords will also share their token. 
In addition, users are required to deal with an added layer of security, which entails additional work and increases 
users’ resistance. Users also tend to forget, misplace, or lose their tokens requiring additional help and costs such 
as the cost to disable and replace the lost token, the costs of temporary tokens, and the cost to reset the system. 
For example, a physician goes on vacation, and, thinking that he will not need access to patients’ records, he leaves 
his token at home or in his office. An emergency occurs, and the physician's specialized skills are needed. Since the 
physician, cannot access the system without the token, the system administrator has to be summoned to reset the 
system, disable the token, and allow temporary remote access without the token. Although the above is a rare 
example, similar scenarios increase users’ frustrations. 
                                                     
11. http://www.cryptocard.com/uploads/Documents/DataSheets/DSKT120071211A4.pdf (last accessed 09/07/2009). 
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Third Generation AC—What You Are 
With the advent of the Internet and e-commerce, organizations started to face additional challenges. First, they had 
to protect not only their own machines, but somehow ensure that personal computers used by online customers are 
also protected. Second, collaboration among websites requires the ability to transfer users’ identity. In addition, e-
commerce increases the exposure of personal data. In the past, most organizational data was internal. With e-
commerce, organizations started to accumulate large amounts of consumers’ private information. Thus, the need for 
increased security, privacy, and protection of users’ financial information (credit cards, bank accounts, and Social 
Security numbers), and medical information resulted in organizations adding another layer of access control. Third-
generation AC relies on one or more biological features of the user. Biometric mechanisms include many 
technologies. The simplest and cheapest are fingerprinting and voice recognition. These two techniques are easy to 
implement and often rely on hardware already embedded in most Personal Computers (such as a microphone) or on 
relatively cheap enhanced equipment (mouse or fingerprinting keyboard—Figures 2 and 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The disadvantage of the fingerprinting and voice recognition techniques is that they are relatively easy to forge and 
are not reliable, especially in a highly noisy environment (for the voice) or a dirty environment (for the fingerprinting). 
Other biometrics techniques include hand and face geometry, palm scans, retina and iris scans. Each of the 
techniques has its benefits and challenges and works best at certain environments and for certain applications. 
Biometrics are ranked based on their type I and type II error rates, ease to forge, level of intrusiveness to the user, 
required environmental conditions, and cost (cost to implement, space and processing requirements, availability of 
equipment). For example, an iris scan, which is the most reliable technique, is intrusive and expensive to implement. 
Biometrics offer an additional layer that can ensure that the user identified is indeed the proper one (authentication). 
However, beyond the limitations of cost and intrusiveness, biometric controls are limited to human actors and would 
not work for bots or web services. In addition, it is difficult to implement biometrics outside organizational 
boundaries. For example, it might be prudent for an online bank to require some level of biometric identification from 
its online customers. However, the bank risks customer resistance to the added cost and a resulting loss of market 
share because of lack of flexibility, fear, or technical limitations. Assuming, a customer wants to access her account 
away from her home computer, she would have to find a computer equipped with the proper biometric device. 
Unless all hardware providers and banks agree on a universal standard configuration that includes certain biometric 
devices and banks provide these devices at little or no cost, mandating the use of biometrics may not be ―good 
business.‖ 
IV. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: THE “SILO” APPROACH 
In recent years, the term identity management replaced the term access control. This new term indicates the need to 
verify the identity of the entity accessing the system and the negotiation of rights and privileges based on privacy 
requirements associated with that identity. Identity management architecture could be server-based, client-based, or 
networked-based [Kock and Worndl 2001]. At present, the most common architecture is proprietary, application 
driven, and server-based. For example, amazon.com and facebook.com each maintains its own users’ information. 
This results in a ―silo‖ approach, as illustrated in Figure 4. That is, a user often has many digital identities, each is 
managed by a different entity and requiring its own resources. 
 
Figure 3. Finger Printing Keyboard 
 
 
Figure 2. Finger Printing Mouse 
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Figure 4. Silo Approach to IdM 
 
A limitation of the silo, server-based approach is that a user must manage a large number of identities. In addition, 
users do not control the maintenance of their identities, privacy requirements, or related attributes. 
For example, Appendix A illustrates the differing requirements of IdMS in three domains: healthcare, which is 
regulated; e-learning, which is relatively open to allow freedom of expression; and e-government, which is highly 
secure to prevent cyber-terror incidents. A user is often a stakeholder in more than one domain and, therefore, is 
likely to maintain a number of partial identities, each with different privacy requirements. In our example, a person 
might be a patient with high privacy requirements. The same person could also be involved in e-learning or e-
teaching, requiring another partial identity (with relatively low privacy requirements) and is most likely engaged in 
some e-government activities (e.g., e-filing of income tax) requiring a highly protected partial identity. In today’s 
society, users are involved in a variety of online activities and access a large number of applications in various 
geographical locations (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. User's Access to System Types  
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In summary, today’s identity management ―silo‖ approach does not align well with most users’ diverse and dispersed 
activities. In addition, this approach does not support web services, ad-hoc and mobile computing, and has the 
following limitations: 
1. It mostly relies on physical identity elements. Thus, an exploitation of a cyber identity could result in 
impersonation in the physical world. 
2. It is relatively easy to break. Attackers can link pseudonyms to real identities. 
3. It is centralized within an application. For each application, the provisioning, maintenance, and management 
are done by that service with little transferability to other services. 
4. Users have to log-on to several systems, creating overhead and loss of productivity. 
5. It lacks federation. Each application uses its own scheme, standards, and requirements in providing 
authentication and permissions. 
6. It is inefficient, expensive, and does not align with current business trends (Figure 5). 
7. It is organizational centric rather than user-controlled. Users have minimal control over their privacy. 
8. Users juggle a large number of identities, each related to a set of application type. These identities are not 
integrated or standardized. 
9. It lacks support for nomadic, wireless, peer-to-peer, and ad-hoc architectures. Since most current IdM are 
server-based, they require the existence of a centralized, static processor. 
10. The current lack of universal standards and governance results in: 
a. Inconsistencies in implementations across organizations and technologies 
b. Lack of universal metrics that measure levels of security of a given application or system 
c. Various systems have different levels of security resulting in inconsistencies. Thus, a very secure 
system may become vulnerable by being associated with a less secure system. 
11. Lack of seamless interoperability among systems. 
Starting in the mid 1990s, a number of companies, consortia, and standardizing organizations attempted to create a 
universal framework for the management of cyber identities. Most notable are the centralized approach introduced 
by Microsoft (i.e. Passport), the federated approach introduced by the Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards (OASIS) and the Liberty Alliance project, and most recently the user-centric 
approach initially developed by Korea’s Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and later 
adopted by the ITU. These and other frameworks are described in detail in Section IX. Each of the approaches uses 
slightly different terminology and is based on a slightly different paradigm. The centralized (Passport) approach is 
rarely used and thus is not discussed further. The federated and user-centric approaches will be discussed in 
Sections IX and X. In the remaining sections of the paper, we integrate the concepts and terminology used by each 
of the approaches. 
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
A person’s physical identity begins when they are born (our name, lineage) and lasts until they pass on. However, 
over their lifetime, people may use a number of logical identities. For example, at work, one is identified based on 
such factors as their position in the organization, job title, skills, and employee id-number. The same person is 
identified based on their social security number and financial portfolio (accounts, investments, loans) by their bank. 
Similarly, a digital identity might take many forms. An entity might have several partial identities depending on their 
cyber activities. As mentioned above, an identity contains three components: identifier, authenticator, and privileges. 
Identity management defines and manages the life-cycle and profiles of digital identities, and the exchange of 
information necessary to validate and authorize these identities. 
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Principles of IdMS 
To overcome some of the limitations in current IdMS, several research groups, policy makers, and industry leaders 
are proposing frameworks for the deployment of IdMS. In this section, we describe several conceptual frameworks. 
In Sections IX through XI, we discuss several global standards currently under development and vendors ’ 
implementations. 
Table 2. Principles of Identity Management Systems [Cameron 2005] 
 
Principle Description Comments 
One User consent An identity is identified and used only when the user 
agrees to it. 
Two Limited disclosure The system provides the minimum identifying 
information required for the transaction. 
Three Fewest parties Only parties that ―need to know‖ receive identifying 
information. 
Four Directional identity Omni-directional versus uni-directional
12
 
Five IdMS should work with a variety of 
identity technologies, run by 
multiple providers. 
Designers cannot assume the feasibility of a 
universal identity or the availability of a single 
expression of an identity. 
Six Human integration High levels of reliability between the human user and 
the system 
Seven  Consistent experience across 
platforms 
Similar to the way the web appears to users 
Cameron [2005] suggests seven principles that should drive the development of IdMS (Table 2). The core of the 
principles is the idea that IdMS should be an encapsulation or a meta-protocol much like the Internet Protocol (IP) or 
the hypertext protocol (HTTP). IP for example, does not care what device is attached to the network, which 
operating system is run, the speed of the network or packaging of the message. As long as the payload (data) is 
packaged in IP compatible packets, transmission over the Internet is achievable. Similar claims can be made about 
HTTP. Conceptually, an IdMS should behave the same way. That is, regardless of the format or content of the digital 
identity, each device attached to the network should be able to process it. 
The seven principles in Table 2 (also known as the “The laws of identity”) describe a conceptual framework of a 
meta-IdMS that drives Microsoft’s implementation of their Digital IdWallet product (see Section X). The framework 
also introduces some technical and social challenges. Most notable, who is to decide what is the ―minimum required‖ 
and who defines ―need to know.‖ We address these challenges in Section VIII. 
Desired Characteristics 
One of the key elements of IdMS is that they will be user-driven (or user-centric). IdMS should be easy to use and 
maintain even by novice computer users. Users should be able to create and revoke partial identities as they see fit, 
based on a set of negotiated and agreed-upon privacy rules. Users should also be able to maintain their own 
profiles. Ideally, the process of provisioning, maintaining, and revoking identities should be as automated as 
possible. 
In addition, IdMS should have at least the following characteristics:
13
 
1. Adaptive. The identity and its management should adapt to changing requirements and system conditions. 
2. Universally accessible. Users access systems from a variety of locations. An IdMS should support a user 
regardless of their physical location, level of connectivity, or protocol used. 
                                                     
12. Omni-directional refers to a public identity that is known and accessible to all (such as a universal web-service, or an RFID tag). Uni-
directional refers to a private identity that is established between the service provider and the user. 
13. Primarily based on a report by the national science and technology council subcommittee on biometrics and identity management published 
in Sept 2008 http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/NSTC%20Reports/IdMReport%20Final.pdf (last accessed 09/03/2009). 
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3. Extensible in space. Allows growing numbers of applications, attributes, and scope (activities). 
4. Cross-domain integration. Allows applications in various domains to communicate and share users’ 
provisions. 
5. Cross-technology integration. Allows access from a variety of devices. 
6. Federated support and distributed management. The ability to integrate partial information to form an identity 
from multiple locations and applications, and certification authorities. 
a. Single sign on and sign out. Users should be able to use one point of entry (authentication) to access a 
federation of services. 
7. In line with current social norms of privacy and in compliance with basic regulatory frameworks. This 
requirement is challenging and is discussed in detail in Section VIII. 
8. Allow minimal risk of exploitation, change, theft, unauthorized transfer, and all other potential misuse. 
Identifiable information is released only when and if required by the transaction. 
9. Support accountability, non-repudiation, and audit-ability. All parties to a transaction should be responsible 
and accountable for the consequences of that transaction. Audit and forensic capabilities are needed to 
track, investigate, and resolve misuse and other disputes. 
10. Viability. Financially viable for organizations. 
11. Support a minimal level of trust. From a technical perspective, a set of minimal standards required to 
authenticate a user and the assurance that one application can provide another as to the security level of that 
user. From a social perspective, trust relates to agreed-upon voluntary governance. The issue of trust is 
discussed further in Sections VI and VIII. 
12. Reputation model. Provides the users with the ability to build reputation over time. 
VI. COMPONENTS OF IDMS 
At present, IdMS frameworks could be characterized by their approach and the type of user they support (Table 3). 
IdMS frameworks are based on the existence of a federated certificate provided by an entity that authenticates the 
user or service, or a token the user (or service) holds. Table 3 describes the prevalent standards and 
implementations. Additional details are given in Section X and Appendix B. In the discussion in this section, we 
include components from all implementations. Often, various implementations have a different name for the same 
technical component. We highlight the parallels when possible. 
Table 3. The Four Paradigms of IdMS 
 
 User Web Services 
Federated OASIS/Liberty Oasis/Liberty 
Token ITU-T WS-* 
 Digital identity repository. IdMS often use a digital identity repository that contains policies and meta-
directories to govern access. In addition, an application privileges system contains information about 
entitlement to resources, information, and access. These repositories may reside on various machines and 
physical locations. They might be implemented on a variety of hardware and software solutions and use a 
number of configurations. The discovery process is used by the provider to locate relevant authentication and 
authority data across distributed domains and systems. Digital identity stores is a term used by Microsoft to 
describe a repository of digital identities. 
 Identity provider (IdP). The IdP links the subject (user, entity) to its given identity, authenticates the subject 
and provides a certificate or a token, which enables other components to recognize the subject. The 
identification and authentication process uses a variety of mechanisms and strengths depending on the 
requirements of the given application. 
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 Relying party/service provider. The services that rely on the credentials provided by the IdP are called relying 
parties. They are also known as Service Providers (SP) since they provide the services requested by the 
user. Service providers have to decide if they accept the assertions provided to them by the IdP for a given 
request from a particular entity. The term identity federation is used to denote a trust relationship between the 
SP and the IdP. An identity federation between the two providers exists when the SP accepts assertions 
about an entity from the IdP. 
 Authentication and certification process. This process certifies the data—the recipient of the data has the 
ability to validate and verify its authenticity. A claim is an assertion that certain identifying information such as 
a name or a credit card truly belongs to a given digital entity. Claims could be an identifier (such as a user 
name) or an attribute (such as a user age or gender). The terms claims and assertions are used in the 
Microsoft sphere. These terms are equated with pseudonyms, partial identities, and linkability in the Open 
Standards sphere. 
The actual implementation of the authentication process varies depending on the standard. For example, 
Microsoft’s CardSpace uses an InfoCard as a way to identify entities to the relying party. In the Liberty 
Alliance model, a user/ entity authenticates once to the service provider using one of its partial identities and 
can then access any service in the provider’s ―circle of trust.‖ The identity provider is the only entity in the 
system that should be able to link a pseudonym to its original owner and thus is accountable for any 
misrepresentation or dispute. 
 Identity providers and notary. Often the communicating parties are unknown to each other and, therefore, 
cannot trust that the identities are properly authenticated. This can occur in ad-hoc or peer-to-peer 
communications. A third party trusted vendor could be employed to authenticate identities and their 
assertion. This is often referred to as a federated notary [Goodrich et al. 2008]. 
 Credentials. ―A credential is an attestation of qualification, competence, or authority issued to an individual by 
a third party with a relevant de jure or de facto authority or assumed competence to do so.‖ Examples of 
credentials include academic diplomas, security clearances, identification documents, badges, passwords, 
user names, keys, and powers of attorney.
14
 
The system determines a set of rules as to who could read, modify, or access a given credential. There are 
several types of credentials: raw credentials, are specified by the user or other entity, without any guarantee 
to their validity, authenticated credentials are digitally authenticated by the user or an issuing party but are 
not validated, and validate credentials, are guaranteed by a credential broker. Credential issuers or brokers 
are third-party trusted entities that issue validated credentials.
15
 Credential brokers might collect credentials 
from a variety of sources. To be trustworthy, credentials should have the following characteristics: unique, 
verifiable, issued by a broker with good standing, and governed. 
 Identity syntax and attributes. An Identity profile should contain several user attributes and credentials. Such 
attributes might be personal data, habits, and biometrics. Different standards and implementations use 
different structures to describe attributes and credentials. Ideally, those should be interoperable. 
 Policy control. Policy control governs access to information and determines how information is used, 
disclosed, audited, and logged. Rather than proprietary, application or operating system driven access 
control, IdMS purport integrative policies to govern access. Policy controls use policy sets, a collection of 
policies, rules, obligations, and a target. The control uses predetermine algorithms to combine rules. A rule 
specifies permission (or a denial) to perform an action on an asset. A target is a set of conditions and actions 
that must be met for a policy to apply. Organizations’ security policies are complex and contain thousands of 
rules. Often policies that affect a particular digital asset are written from a variety of views and are difficult to 
integrate.
16
 Languages such as XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup Language) enable developers to 
combine all the policies that affect a request (for service, or asset) into one integrative policy. Policy controls 
may also generate alerts, when information is accessed. 
 
                                                     
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credentials (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
15. It is possible that the IdP will also act as a credential broker but not necessary. 
16. For example, request to access a mail sever could be handled by a system-specific policy that determined the configuration of a firewall (that 
is the firewall is configured to allow access to the server from any IP address but only through ports 25 and 80). Alternatively, it could be 
handled by an issue-specific policy that deals with users’ accounts and rights. 
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 Provisioning. Companies enable users’ access to certain digital assets (e.g., networks, applications, devices 
such as a PDA, or credit cards). The process of rationing assets to employees is termed provisioning. While 
the term provisioning is often used in reference to employees, organizations also provision assets to other 
stakeholders, such as temporary employees, consultants, customers, and suppliers. Provisioning mechanism 
refers to the automation of the workflow of systems, devices, services, and other resources to various 
stakeholders. For example, as a temporary employee logs into a system, they are provisioned access to 
certain resources and services depending on their role and tasks. At the end of their engagement, the system 
de-provisions these resources. Similarly, a web service might be provisioned access to a particular data store 
for the duration of a request. 
 Token. As mentioned above, some standards and implementations use the concept of a token. A token 
contains claims (or assertions) about the entity requesting the service (the requestor) and may be codified 
using a variety of structures (for example, WS-* uses the concept of token and can seamlessly interoperate 
with other tokens regardless of the structure they use). A Security Token Service (STS) and related protocols 
are used to request or issue the token (i.e., WS-Trust), while a related set of policies describe the STS and 
its associated claims (i.e., WS-SecurityPolicy). 
Technical Aspects of a Universal Trust Model 
Applications rely on the identity assertion established by the identity provider. There has to be a certain level of trust 
between the application and the provider. That level of trust varies depending on the subject, its roles, the 
applications’ level of security and the privileges provided to the subject. A global trust model is required to support a 
universally accepted identity management system. Such a model requires accepted standards and metrics. For 
example, a credit card transaction in country X will receive assertion from the provider associated with the card 
issuer residing in country Y. The various stakeholders (i.e., cardholder, merchant, issuing bank, clearing house, 
Credit Card Company) are likely to have separate systems and reside in different physical locations. Yet, typically, 
they all agree on what constitutes a legitimate credit card transaction for the particular card used and the particular 
holder, and what level of assertion is required to accomplish such a transaction. Conceptually a universal digital 
identity should work the same. Establishing a certain set of global requirements, standards, and metrics are an 
integral part of a universal trust model. The Liberty Alliance ―circle of trust‖ has 150 members with 400 million 
Liberty-enabled identities and clients, while a token approach assumes that possession of a token implies trust. 
However, at present (in 2009), we see a large number of ―islands of trust‖ rather than a universal trust system. 
Identity Life-Cycle 
The traditional identity lifecycle is sequential, starting at the origination of a digital identity through its maintenance 
and, finally, termination. A digital identity life-cycle contains the following stages:
17
 
 Establish the identity by linking the pseudonym to an entity’s information. For example, a user might establish 
a user’s name and password, which is linked to a bank account, a credit card, and other financial information. 
 Re-establish the identity. A second pseudonym may be linked to the same information (i.e., another service 
is using the credit card to complete a purchase), or pseudonym is linked to additional information. 
 Describe the identity by assigning it attributes. These attributes may be specific to a certain entity or service. 
 Maintenance. Over time, the various attributes assigned to an identity are likely to change. 
 Audits. Log and record the activities of an identity and allow user access to the log for verification purposes. 
 Analysis. Analyze patterns of an identity’s behavior. Analysis enables the system to create base-line behavior 
patterns and alerts when behavior deviates from the established baseline. 
 Terminate the identity when necessary. Disassociate the pseudonym from the entity. 
However, this sequential approach is insufficient when dealing with multiple identities for a given object at any given 
time. Dimiani et al. [2003] suggest that provisioning of identities should be automated. That is, users should be able 
to automatically obtain and create identities allowing easy and fast access to information resources. This approach 
is applicable mostly in the web environment or inter-organizational settings. In intra-organizational settings, auto-
provisioning reduces user reliance on helpdesk and is more cost effective. Automated provisioning must comply with 
                                                     
17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_management_systems (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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organizational policies. Thus, when a user creates an identity, her privileges are limited to information and resources 
applicable to her role, rights, and needs. 
Revocation should also be automated. When an employee leaves a company, all her provisions are revoked 
automatically. Automated revocation and synchronization of all relevant accounts is a technical and an 
organizational challenge. For example, an employee of Intel gave two weeks notice before leaving for a job with a 
competitor. Based on organizational policies, his privileges remained the same for the two weeks between his notice 
and departure. The employee downloaded a large number of confidential documents depicting future chip designs. 
Intel sued the employee. In his defense, the employee claimed that he acted within the bounds of the law, since at 
the time he downloaded the documents he had legal access to that information. At the time of the lawsuit, the 
employee did not sell the information or share it with anyone and thus was within his legal rights.
18
 This case 
exemplifies the complexity involved in auto-revocation of authority. Organizations must decide at what stage of the 
separation process an authority is revoked. An alternative concept is partial or gradual revocation in which 
organizational policies trigger reduction in privileges when an employee announces his intended separation. 
More generally, when an employee changes location, position, or role, the IdMS should automatically change the 
employee’s provisions. This process is easier to implement if proper communication exists between Human 
Resources and the Information Security function. 
In summary, user-driven, policy control identity management life cycle is heavily depended on strong organizational 
policies and their clear implementation both at a technical level (automated provisioning and revocation) and at the 
organizational level (communicating changes in rights, assignments, and rules). 
VII. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
Despite notable advances achieved in the development of IdM concepts, standards, and implementations, a number 
of technical challenges remain to be solved. Some of the technical issues are being researched and can be resolved 
with additional technological developments, while other issues may be more complex and will require universal 
agreements. 
 Proliferation of dormant identities. As discussed in Section IV, profile management of a digital identity should 
be user-driven, limiting the users’ reliance on the helpdesk. However, systems should be able to limit the 
proliferation of unused identities, and the number of identities created by users. Often when users forget their 
identifying information (id, password), it is easier for them to create a new identity with slightly different 
parameters than to ask helpdesk for the original information (or a reset). It is difficult for websites (especially 
e-commerce sites) to keep track of duplicate partial identities. A proliferation of rarely used identities 
increases hacking risks
19
 and waste of resources. At the same time, the decision when to archive or purge a 
partial identity when dealing with external entities (such as an e-commerce website’s management of casual 
buyers) must be managed cautiously. Deleting a dormant identity may result in the loss of a potential 
customer. Organizations should decide whether the risk of losing a potential customer exceeds the risk of 
maintaining a large number of dormant identities. For example, I use Travelocity.com because they already 
have my profile and I can complete a transaction quickly and efficiently. However, occasionally, my account 
remains dormant for six months or even a year. Upon returning, I expect to be able to use my old account 
and my old profile. If I find that my identity was removed and I have to re-provision, I am likely to try a 
competing site. 
 Where should the various components be located? A server-based IdM results in a ―silo‖ approach and 
depends on the existence of a central processor (Section IV). A client-based IdM enables users to manage 
and control their identities and is not application dependent. However, inasmuch as users use a variety of 
clients (e.g., a desktop at home or work, laptops, PDA, smart phones), they would need to implement a 
version of their IdM on each client. A third alternative is a distributed system. However, distributed IdM 
presents additional challenges of interoperability and compatibility across systems. 
 Automated lifecycle. The idea of an automated lifecycle (specifically provisioning and revocation) could be 
implemented for intra-organizational systems where the boundaries are clear. Users are provisioned access 
when they work for the company (e.g., as a permanent employee, consultant, vendor) and are revoked when 
their engagement is over. However, when the relationships between the service and the user are ad-hoc, 
automated provisioning is more difficult to implement. 
                                                     
18. http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200838/2027/AMD-employee-charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets-from-Intel (last accessed 
08/16/2009). 
19. Hackers often use dormant accounts when breaking into systems. 
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 Representation. Another technical challenge is the representation of a digital identity and the best format in 
which to exchange attributes and assertions between resources. This is especially a challenge when a digital 
entity requires access to a number of partner systems, each running on a different architecture, network, 
operating system and each with its own set of requirements. Dimiani et al. [2003] suggests identity ontology 
and a metadata describing the entity. However, the syntax for profiles should reveal the minimal disclosure 
required to complete a transaction. 
 Interoperability. When creating digital identities, organizations often collect data from a variety of sources. 
This may lead to interoperability issues. This challenge is augmented by the current lack of an interoperable, 
universal standard. In addition, the number of attributes for an entity can depend on who defined the identity. 
IdMS should be able to consolidate these definitions and create an interoperable meta-definition that is 
recognized by all participating asset providers. Often a user is identified by one source, but the transaction 
requires the involvement of several partnering organizations. Although the originating partner provisions the 
entity, the remaining partners should be able to determine their own level of trust. For example, a user enters 
a system via a portal and provides a user-id and password, which is deemed sufficient to browse certain e-
commerce sites. However, when the user is ready to purchase an item, the e-commerce website (who the 
user is accessing through the portal) might or might not feel that the user-id and password are sufficient to 
verify the user’s ability to pay for the purchase. The site is likely to require additional information, such as a 
credit card, a PayPal account, or a bank account number. Ideally, an IdMS should contain enough metadata 
to eliminate such interoperability challenges. 
 Consolidate attributes. Similarly, an IdMS should be able to consolidate attributes and other relevant pieces 
of information regarding the user’s identity that are stored in various places and are accessible in various 
contexts. Continuing the Travelocity example above, assuming that a user accesses a car rental website 
through the Travelocity portal, the car rental company uses Travelocity.com’s initial identity provisioning to 
―trust‖ the inquiry. In addition, when ready to make the car reservation, the car rental company, needs a form 
of payment guarantee and information regarding the user’s driving credentials. On the other hand, if a user 
purchases a flight ticket, the airline company is interested in different information. Presently, users provide 
such information manually and separately. Ideally, an IdMS should be able to determine the context and 
needs of each partnering organization and provide enough information to generate a trusted transaction, but 
not more. 
 Single point of failure. The reliance on a single sign on or a central IdP could potentially create a virtual single 
point of failure. Any failure of that service could cause the entire system to collapse. A failure could be the 
result of a hacking attack, a compromise of the policy repository, a physical cause (e.g., power failure) or any 
other technical problem that would compromise the service integrity or availability. 
 Balancing between linkability for accountability purposes and privacy. User driven IdMS should enable users 
to decide which identity they want to use and which attributes and credentials they want to release when 
conducting a particular transaction. However, for the sake of accountability, some linking to private (or 
identifiable) information is required, endangering privacy. At present, the ability to provide accountability 
without exposing some level of private information (to potential attackers) remains a challenge. Similarly, 
IdMS should link just ―the right amount‖ of information needed to complete the transaction. Cameron [2005] 
terms it ―minimal disclosure‖ (see Table 2). However, deciding how much information is ―just enough‖ could 
be a challenge when managing a large and dynamic number of entities, identities, and credentials. 
Papastergiou et al. [2007] proposed a framework for privacy-enhancing IdMS with high levels of 
minimization. The proposed model allows users to make an informed decision regarding their pseudonyms 
and partial identities. Users can control which personal data is linked to a given partial identity. Although this 
proposal is a potential solution to the linkability problem, it relies on users’ technical sophistication and 
security awareness. This issue is discussed further in Section VIII. 
 Reputation building model. Presently, most reputation-building models are based on the number of times an 
entity accessed a resource or service. Gaining ―reputation‖ could improve the performance of the system and 
the services provided to users. However, attackers can use these algorithms to increase their reputation 
artificially until they gain enough credentials to launch an attack. This approach is similar to what happened 
to eBay, where a group of social engineers conducted ―legitimate‖ transactions (buying and selling) among 
themselves, increasing their ratings over time.
20
 Once they had high ratings, they started posting fictitious 
expensive products for sale. They received the money but never sent the items to the buyers. Subsequently, 
eBay established escrow services for expensive items. The same scenario could occur in the domain of 
identity reputation. However, creating ―escrows‖ for identity credentials is more complex. 
                                                     
20. http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-238489.html&tag=mncol%3btxt (last accessed 09/12/2009). 
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 Performance. Strong encryption and complicated access control policies could cause the system 
performance to deteriorate. Occasionally, requirements are relaxed to accommodate for performance. For 
example, under Kerberos, a SOAP message is accompanied by a ticket. Due to performance considerations, 
only the first message contains the ticket. Following messages contain a KeyIdentifier—a hash value of the 
ticket. With the increase in network and processor speed and the development of special security appliances, 
performance issues will decrease. 
 Possible attacks. Finally, computer scientists and researchers are discovering various possible attacks 
against published standards. For example, Cervesato et al. [2007] described a man-in-the-middle attack that 
can breach the authentication guarantees of Kerberos. Sidharth and Liu [2007] described several potential 
attacks against web services that could be used to compromise identities and their authentication. Alrodham 
and Mitchell [2007] illustrated two possible vulnerabilities in CardSpace,
21
 an identity management system 
used by Microsoft. 
VIII. SOCIAL CHALLENGES 
In addition to the technical challenges discussed in Section VII, the development of universal identity management 
systems faces major social challenges. 
Trust 
One of the challenges facing eLife is the lack of trust by users. As the number of cyber attacks and identity thefts 
increases, it will be more difficult to convince users to trust technology. IdMS, as a new technology, face several 
similar trust issues. 
 Users’ trust of the system. Users should be able to trust the various components and agents involved in 
setting their identities, linking private information to pseudonyms, and provisioning resources. Users should 
also be able to audit these agents and verify the information and credentials they provide others. 
 Trust among service and identity providers. Although, some ―circle of trust‖ include a large number of 
participants and stakeholders, not all of them could be ―trusted.‖ Recent cases of security attacks against 
credit card processors and other financial companies, and the exposure of private data, creates doubt in their 
ability to secure data stores. Yet the core concept of federated and distributed identities depends on the 
ability of any service (also termed relying service) to trust the credentials provided to them by other entities. 
 Trust among agents and services that originate from participating countries. Due to lack of a central 
governing body and a universal set of laws, trust is limited to agents and services that originate from 
participating countries. However, it is relatively easy for hackers in non-cooperating countries to circumvent 
messages and ―pretend‖ to be a trustworthy provider, agent, or service. This subterfuge can result in a 
greater lack of trust among participants. 
Privacy Issues 
One of the desired characteristics of IdMS is to be in-line with current social norms and privacy requirements. 
However, the concept of privacy varies by individual, society, and culture. Privacy is defined differently in different 
countries. For example, South Korea requires all bloggers to register their real name and identity number (equivalent 
to social security number) before being able to post messages online. For residents of the U.S., such a request is 
considered an invasion of privacy. In April 2009, the Korean government asked Google.com to adapt their system 
(i.e., require the registration of real identities) for users that upload videos to YouTube or cease operation in Korea. 
Initially, the company stated they would eliminate uploading capabilities in Korea. However, as of July 2009, Google. 
com executives are debating between discontinuing their presence in Korea or requiring the disclosure of users’ real 
name and number from any video upload originating in Korea.
22
 This example illustrates the difficulties in creating a 
universal identity management system that would accommodate privacy needs of all countries and cultures. 
In addition, balancing between accountability and privacy is a challenge. The basic idea of IdMS is to increase 
privacy by assigning pseudonyms to entities. However, to ensure audit capabilities and non-repudiation, identity 
providers have to maintain a link between the pseudonym and the entity, limiting users’ privacy. An attack on the 
identity providers’ systems may result in the exposure of millions of links and user private information.
23
 
                                                     
21. For more information on CardSpace see http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/aa663320.aspx (last accessed 09/01/2009). 
22. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/304002.html. 
23. At the Blackhat conference (2009), Kaminski, a well known hacker, described how to trick a certificate authority into providing a certificate to 
an unqualified entity (http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10299459-245.html?tag=mncol;txt). 
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Global Reach or a Digital Divide? 
The Internet’s global reach creates social issues related to Identity management. Differing information security laws 
among countries provide ―safe heavens‖ for hackers. Countries with limited privacy and security laws are known as 
hotbeds for hacking attacks. Hackers could potentially use social engineering methods to set fake identities and 
build trust over time. Once those identities are trusted, they can be used to extract information and access secure 
websites. 
Another challenge related to universality is the potential creation of a digital divide. Many of the standards used to 
implement federated identities are based on the concept of ―circle of trust.‖ Circles of trust are industry, services, or 
even country based (i.e., the Shibboleth project in the U.K.)
24
 and thus result in a number of ―islands of trust.‖ 
Federated identities could provide great benefits to the companies in the circle and draw users to these websites. 
However, many third-world counties might be excluded due to their unfavorable legal environments, lack of 
compliance, or poor infrastructure. Organizations in these countries might be prevented from joining the circle of 
trust resulting in loss of potential improvements in their Internet environment, leading to the reversal of current efforts 
to introduce technology and the Internet to underdeveloped countries. In addition, the membership in the circle has 
to be maintained over time. As new technology is introduced and as hackers develop new attacks, companies in the 
circle need to upgrade their systems in a timely manner.
25
 The ―circle‖ has to appoint an objective and independent 
entity to inspect members periodically and ensure that they continue to comply with existing and new standards. 
Rules of removal and reinstatement of members must be universally acceptable. 
Finally, since there is no universal governing body that regulates the Internet, disputes over IdMS and repudiation of 
transactions could not be easily resolved. Identity and credential brokers do not and could not have global 
jurisdiction. That is, credentials provided by a broker in one country may not be accepted in a disputed litigation in a 
court of another country. 
Users’ Awareness and Training 
User centric IdMS require users’ awareness and training. For example, the concept of ―minimum data‖ is based on 
the idea that users decide what information should be disclosed to an entity and who ―needs to know.‖ Similarly, the 
concept of maintaining a client-based token requires some understanding of what it is and what should be done to 
keep it safe. These decisions require users to understand the various types of information, their privacy level, rules, 
and policies of websites they access and determine a basic set of rules that best work for them. At present, most 
users have limited understanding of these issues. In addition, social engineers pry on users’ naiveté regarding 
information security and identity management, resulting in increased identity theft incidents. 
Even within organizations, end-users are rarely trained enough to comply with organizational information security 
policies. This problem intensifies when dealing with non-organizational users (e.g., elderly, less educated). Who 
would be responsible for the training and awareness of users, and what methods are best to achieve such massive 
training remains to be seen. 
Identity Management or Big Brother 
Although technically, federated identity does not mean ―one identity fits all,‖ conceptually the loss of one access 
mechanism could open the door to many websites. At present, many breaches are the result of users’ mistakes or 
social engineering attacks. For example, as stated in Section III, users tend to share their passwords if they believe 
that the asking entity is in a position of authority, a friend, or someone in need [Cazier and Botelho 2007]. Presently, 
due to the ―silo‖ approach, if a user reveals her user-id and password (intentionally or not), a hacker could gain 
access to one or two websites at most. With federated IdM, access to one’s user-id could potentially open access to 
the person’s entire portfolio. Thus, although federated identity could improve access management, it could also 
increase risk. Hackers will gain more financially
26
 by getting a person’s identity information and are likely to increase 
their efforts to obtain such information. Given that most such information is stored at the IdP, these systems are 
likely to become an obvious target for hacking attacks. Similarly, in countries where the government controls access 
to the Internet, the existence of a federated IdM could increase government control over users and limit free access 
to resources. 
                                                     
24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shibboleth. 
25. What constitute ―timely‖ has to be decided by the standards organizations and participating members. 
26. The market value of an identity increases as the number of websites it accesses increases. 
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IX. STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS 
In the preceding sections, we introduced the proposed conceptualization and frameworks of IdMS and some of the 
socio-technical challenges involved in the implementation of such systems. In the following sections, we detail 
existing standards and vendor implementations, and compare the conceptual frameworks to these implementations. 
We find that, at present, several standards setting organizations operate in the IdMS arena and although their 
proposed standards contain some common components and building blocks, the standards remain isolated. Thus, 
we conclude that without convergence, the future of IdMS is in question. These standards address two main areas: 
1. User driven access to the web and other resources 
2. Web services accessibility 
The Microsoft’s approach (adopted by the ITU-T) and the OASIS/Liberty approach (Appendix B) differ substantively. 
Microsoft IdM provides a token that the user can use to access any website. This approach is similar to a key that 
opens many but not all doors. Once the entity receives the key from the identity provider (gatekeeper), it can open X 
number of doors, depending on the key. Once inside the room, the entity could engage in various activities (gain 
access to various assets), depending on the room and the type of key it has. The ITU-T standard is user-driven. It 
enables the user to access any resource that accepts the key regardless of location or affiliation. However, it also 
depends on the users’ ability to maintain the security and confidentiality of the key. 
Liberty IdM authenticates a partial identity of an entity once, and then the identity is free to use all services that are 
part of a given circle of trust. The Liberty approach is similar to a person given access to a large hall by the guard. 
Once inside, the person can use any facility in the hall. Its presence in a particular ―circle of trust‖ is enough to grant 
it access to services. This approach assumes a central authority within each circle and results in potentially many 
―islands.‖ 
OASIS27 
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) was initially formed in 1993 as 
the Standard Generalized Markup (SGML Open), and is presently a global consortium. OASIS promotes the 
development and adoption of e-business and web standards such as web services, e-commerce, security, law and 
government, supply chain, and computing management. In 1998, the high tech industry shifted to XML. As a result, 
SGML Open converted from SGML to XML and changed its name to OASIS. Also, the focus of the consortium 
shifted from promoting adoption to developing technical specifications. In 1999 OASIS was approached by The 
United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), a committee of the United 
Nations dealing with standards for business, to jointly develop a new set of specifications for electronic business. 
Initially, OASIS had five technical committees; by 2004 there were seventy. 
Specific standards related to IdM developed or adopted by OASIS include: 
 SAML—Security Assertion Makeup Language, a standard XML-based framework for the secure exchange of 
authentication and authorization data. OASIS approved SAML v. 1.0 as a standard in November 2002 and 
SAML v. 1.1 in August 2003. OASIS approved SAML v. 2.0 as a Committee Draft in December 2004 and as 
a standard in early 2005. 
 SPML—Service Provisioning Markup Language, a standard XML-based framework for the secure exchange 
and interoperation of service provisioning requests. OASIS approved SPML v. 1.0 as a standard in 
November 2003. 
 XACML—eXtensible Access Control Markup Language, a standard XML-based protocol for access control 
policies. XACML is a method for conveying biometric identity data such as retina scans and fingerprints. 
OASIS approved XACML v. 1.0 as a standard in February 2003, approved v. 1.1 in August 2003, and v. 2.0 
in September 2004. 
 WS-Security—Web Services Security, a standard method for attaching security data to a web services 
message. OASIS approved WS-Security v. 1.0 as a Standard in April 2004. 
Some argue that the liscensing restrictions posed by OASIS render their standard as not open and hinder universal 
adoption. This topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                     
27. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OASIS (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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Liberty Alliance 
Liberty alliance was formed in 2001 and is a consortium of sixteen companies representing a variety of industry 
leaders such as Sun Microsystems, AOL, American Express, Nokia, and Entrust. The organization presently has 
over 150 members, including governments, and educational institutions. A members list can be found at http://www 
projectliberty.org/liberty/membership/. 
According to the project website, there are more than 400 million Liberty-enabled identities and clients globally. In 
addition, hundreds of companies and organizations participate in the various special interest groups (SIGs) and 
activities. Their goal is to develop open source standards and best practices for the implementation of IdMS. 
Enabling devices and identities of all types to be linked by federation and protected by universal authentication. As 
of 2009, The Liberty Alliance project had tracked over a billion identities and devices using one or more of their 
standards. 
Figure 6 describes the general Liberty model developed by Cameron and Jones [2006], using a single sign-on. A 
―principal‖ or user federates various identities to a single identity issued by an IdP. The user can access services 
provided by Service Providers (SPs) within the same circle of trust by authenticating once to the IdP. Access relies 
on a pre-established trust relationship between the IdP and every SP in the circle of trust. In Figure 6, the user has 
federated its identities within the circle of trust A and circle of trust B. 
 
Figure 6. The Liberty Model. Adapted from Alrodhan [2008] 
 
Figure 7 describes the architecture proposed by Liberty. The Liberty implementation specifications are divided into 
three frameworks: the Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) [Watson 2009], the Identity Web Services Framework 
(ID-WSF) [Tourzan and Koga 2009] and the Service Interface Specifications (ID-SIS) [Kellomaki 2003]. These 
frameworks are discussed in more detail in Section X. 
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Figure 7. The Liberty Frameworks. Adapted from Alrodhan [2008] 
 
ID-FF Liberty profile types include Single Sign-On and Federation Profiles, Register Name Identifier Profiles, Identity 
Federation Termination Notification Profiles, Single Logout Profiles, Identity Provider Introduction, Name Identifier 
Mapping Profile, and Name Identifier Encryption Profile. 
ITU and ITU-T28 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was founded as the International Telegraph Union in Paris in May 
1865. It was established to standardize and regulate international radio and telecommunications. The ITU main 
responsibilities include standardization, allocation of radio spectrum, and organizing interconnection arrangements 
among countries for international phone calls. The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations, and its 
recommended standards carry a high degree of international recognition compared with other organizations that 
publish technical specifications. 
The ITU contains three sectors:
29
 
 Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T): Secretariat is the Telecommunication Standardization 
Bureau (TSB), known prior to 1992 as the International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee 
(CCITT). 
 Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R): Secretariat is the Radiocommunication Bureau (BR), known prior to 
1992 as the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR). 
 Telecommunication Development Sector (ITU-D): Secretariat is the Telecommunication Development Bureau 
(BDT), created in 1992. 
The ITU is an intergovernmental public-private partnership and as of 2009 has 191 countries in its membership, 700 
public and private sector companies, and international and regional telecommunication divisions. 
ITU-T30 
The ITU-T coordinates and ensures efficient and timely standards for all areas of telecommunications for the ITU. 
The international standards proposed by the ITU-T are referred to as "recommendations." They become mandatory 
only when they are adopted as part of a national law for a given country. As the Internet and the web became 
                                                     
28. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITU (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
29. http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/50/docs/ITU-T_50.pdf (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
30. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITU-T (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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prevalent, the ITU decided to rename the International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCITT) 
to Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T). This change in name broadened the scope of the committee 
to include networks and other telecommunication areas. 
The ITU-T publishes new and updated ―recommendations‖ regularly. As of 2009, it has over 3,270 
―recommendations‖ in their library. Also, the ITU-T facilitates the cooperation with other standards developing 
organizations (SDOs) to avoid duplication of standards and conflicting standards.
31
 The ITU-T cooperates with the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
32
 
The development of recommendations are carried out by members and associates, while the executive arm of the 
ITU-T, the TSB, coordinates workshops and seminars in information and communications technologies. The 
technical work is managed by 13-study groups (SGs) and experts in telecommunications. SGs are then supported 
by Focus groups (FGs) to expedite the standardization needs. FGs have greater freedom to organize and finance 
than SGs, and involve nonmembers. Recent work includes Next Generation Networking, Internet Protocol, and 
digital identity management (ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T)—Focus Groups). 
The rise of the personal computer and rapid technology development forced the committee to streamline its approval 
process. The approval of a recommendation is a fast-track procedure termed the Alternative Approval Process 
(AAP). AAP was implemented in 2001. The process reduced the time of the standardization by 80–90 percent. Prior 
to 2001, a proposal could take four to five years for approval, but today, an initial proposal of a draft document by a 
member entity to final approval of a full-status ―recommendation‖ may be accomplished in a few months. The use of 
electronic documents once the approval process is initiated eliminated additional physical meetings. The draft 
recommendation is submitted for review and, if agreed, is given consent for a final review process. TSB announces 
the start of the AAP process by calling for comments on the ITU-T website. The ―last call‖ is a four-week process in 
which member states and sector members can submit comments. If there are no comments, but editorial 
corrections, the recommendation is approved. If there are comments, the SG and TSB set up a comment resolution 
process with the revised text posted on the web for an additional three week review process. Again, If there are no 
comments, but editorial corrections, the recommendation is approved. If comments are posted, the draft text and 
comments proceed to the next SG for more discussion and a new approval process.
33
 
The ITU-T issues recommendations that have series names such as X.500. X is the series and 500 is the identifying 
number. The X series is described as data networks, open system communications, and security. 
X. COMMON STANDARDS 
This section describes the most common IdMS related standards. We start with Kerberos as the oldest standard still 
in use (most Secure Socket Layer implementations use Kerberos). The rest of the standards are organized 
chronologically and by the originating organization.  
Kerberos34 
Kerberos is one of the earlier security standards developed.
35
 Kerberos, developed by MIT (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology), is a computer network procedure that allows businesses to communicate securely over a non-
secure network by proving their identity. A client-server model is used to prove mutual authentication of user and 
server’s identities using a symmetric key cryptography and a trusted third party, rather than public key encryption.  
MIT developed Kerberos with some of their major vendors and users such as Sun Microsystems, Apple, Google, 
Microsoft, and Centrify Corporation. Kerberos version (v.) 4 was published in the 1980s. V. 5 was published in 1993 
to reduce limitations and security issues of v. 4. Kerberos allows an authenticated user to log on and access all 
network resources required. Messages are protected against eavesdropping and replay attacks. An et al. [2006, 
p.176), argue that Kerobos could be a useful tool for the development of secure RFID applications. The use of RFID 
technology in ubiquitous applications (e.g., u-city, u-farms) is an example of a peer-to-peer (p-2-p) nomadic network. 
                                                     
31. http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/50/docs/ITU-T_50.pdf (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
32. http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/0A/0F/T0A0F0000090001PDFE.pdf (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
33. http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/0A/0F/T0A0F0000090001PDFE.pdf and http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/e-flash/022-jan06.html (last accessed 
08/16/2009). 
34. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol) (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
35. Versions 1 through 3 were used only internally by MIT, version 4 was published in the late 80s. Version 5 was the first to be adopted as a 
standard. Its first specifications were published in 1993. 
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Figure 8. Example of the Common Portions of an Assertion. Adapted from Maler [2005] 
 
OASIS based Standards 
SAML
36
 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and 
authorization data between an IdP and a SP. SAML allows business entities to make assertions regarding the 
identity, attributes, and entitlements of a subject to other entities, such as a partner company or another enterprise 
application. SAML defines a standardized mechanism for the secure communication of identity information between 
businesses.
37
 An IdP asserts information about a subject and guarantees that a user has been authenticated with 
certain attributes. The SP relies on the information given by the IdP [Goodrich et al. 2008; Cantor et al. 2009]. For 
example, Google is using SAML as a SP and can authenticate users that are trying to access secured content 
through ―home built‖ IdP [Sturdevant 2007]. SAML also supports a Single Sign-On (SSO), which provides the user 
with the ability to authenticate in one domain while using resources in other domains without re-authenticating 
[Pfitzman and Waidner 2002]. Figure 8 depicts an example of assertion using SAML 2.0. Although SAML is an 
OASIS standard, the identity federation architecture of Liberty Alliance is compliant with the SAML 2.0 standard 
(Liberty Alliance Project). 
SPML
38
 
Service provisioning is the preparation of IT systems’ resources that are required to carry out a specific action 
(Section IX). Provisioning automates the management of user or system’s entitlements relative to electronically 
published services. Service Provisioning Markup Language (SPML) is an XML-based open standard that facilitates 
the exchange of user, resource, and service specifications information between organizations. It is used for the 
integration and interoperation of service provisioning requests. Figure 9 illustrates a provisioning process using 
SPML version 1. SPML was developed by OASIS and evolved from three earlier competing specifications [Sodhi 
2004]. SPML 1.0 was accepted in 2003, and 2.0 was accepted in 2006. 
                                                     
36. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAML (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
37. http://saml.xml.org/about-saml (last accessed 08/16/2009).. 
38. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPML (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
<saml:Assertion 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" 
Version="2.0" 
IssueInstant="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z"> 
<saml:Issuer> 
www.acompany.com 
</saml:Issuer> 
<saml:Subject> 
<saml:NameID 
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"> 
j.doe@company.com 
</saml:NameID> 
</saml:Subject> 
<saml:Conditions 
NotBefore="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z" 
NotOnOrAfter="2005-01-31T12:00:00Z"> 
</saml:Conditions> 
... statements go here ... 
</saml:Assertion> 
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Figure 9. Sample Business Scenario—Externalization of Provisioning 
Activities Using SPML. Adapted from Sodhi [2004] 
Figure 9 illustrates the process used for provisioning using SPML. The requesting authority sends a request to the 
provisioning service (e.g., eTrust) that supports SPML. The PSP allocates resources and send a reply to the RA. As 
illustrated in Figure 10, a PSP might draw on resources managed by several provisioning Service Targets (PSTs) 
and might communicate with other provisioning services to request additional resources. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. SPML Provisioning Architecture. Adapted from Verma [2005] 
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SPML allows organizations to set up interfaces for web services and applications though web portals, application 
servers, and service centers that generate provisioning requests within and between organizations. The automation 
of user or system entitlement using SPML eliminates proprietary issues (e.g., silo, proprietary access solutions). 
Also, establishing interoperability between provisioned systems allows an organization to centrally create end-user 
accounts for web services and applications [Peterson 2003]. 
XACML
39
 
The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a standard to describe and interpret access control 
policies, implemented in XML, and used as a processing model. XACML was initially developed by a consortium of 
companies (Entrust Inc., IBM, OpenNetworks.org, Quadrasis Inc., Sterling Commerce Inc., Sun Microsystems, and 
BEA Systems Inc.). Subsequently, OASIS adopted XACML as one of its standards. The first actual implementation 
of XACML was developed by Sun Microsystems Inc. in Java and is available at http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net. The 
most recent v. 2.0 was approved on February 1, 2005, and the newest v. 3.0 has been in preparation since 2007. 
XACML uses two main engines: Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). PDP evaluates 
the policies based on Requests. PEP is the application-specific element that enforces access to a resource, and 
generates requests on a PDP. Figure 11 shows an example of a request command using XACML. The example 
shows a user requesting access to a web site. 
XACML attribues allow [Ardagna et al. 2004, p. 45]: 
 The unification of access control languages; encourages reusability 
 The unification of multi-application tools for managing and writing access control policies 
 Extensions to the access control language to accommodate other access control policies 
 One policy to contain or refer to another 
 
 
Figure 11. User’s Request Using XACML Adapted from Ardagna [2004] 
 
XACML’s advantages over other access-control policy languages include [Russell 2003]: 
 Security administrators can describe an access-control policy once, without having to rewrite it numerous 
times in different application-specific languages. 
 Application developers do not have to invent their own policy languages and write code to support them; they 
can reuse existing, standardized code. 
                                                     
39. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XACML (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
<schema majorVersion="1" minorVersion="0"> 
<providerIdentifier providerIDType="urn:oasis:names:tc:SPML:1:0#URN"> 
<providerID>urn:oasis:names:tc:SecF</providerID> 
</providerIdentifier> 
<schemaIdentifier schemaIDType="urn:oasis:names:tc:SPML:1:0#GenericString"> 
<schemaID>PersonSchema</schemaID> 
</schemaIdentifier> 
<attributeDefinition name="FullName" 
description="Full name of the employee joining."/> 
<attributeDefinition name="email" description="E-mail address."/> 
<attributeDefinition name="description" description="Description."/> 
<attributeDefinition name="project" description="Project assigned to."/> 
<objectclassDefinition name="employee" description="Sample employee."> 
<memberAttributes> 
<attributeDefinitionReference name="FullName" required="true"/> 
<attributeDefinitionReference name="email" required="true"/> 
<attributeDefinitionReference name="description"/> 
<attributeDefinitionReference name="project" required="true"/> 
</memberAttributes> 
</objectclassDefinition> 
</schema> 
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 XACML is intended to be primarily a machine-generated language. XACML creators expect that user-friendly 
tools for writing and managing XACML policies will be developed, since they can be used with many 
applications. 
 XACML can accommodate most access-control policy needs and support new requirements as they emerge. 
 A single XACML policy can be applied to many resources, which reduce inconsistencies and eliminate 
duplication of effort in creating policies for different resources. 
 With XACML, one policy can refer to another. In a large organization, a policy for a specific site might 
reference both a companywide policy and a country-specific policy. 
Liberty Alliance Project Standards 
The following set of standards was developed by the Liberty Alliance project and is often discussed under the 
umbrella of the Identity federation framework (ID-FF). The goal of the framework is to eliminate the present ―silo‖ 
approach to identity management (Section IV) and create a globally networked user identity where all attributes, 
rules and policies are accessible to and from each entity involved, using the concept of ―circles of trust.‖ 
ID-FF
40
 
ID-FF is an open-source-based framework, for creating standardized, multivendor, cross-organizational federations 
of identities. The term federation denotes a circle of organizations whose business relations are based on Liberty 
Alliance architecture and operational agreements where a user can perform online transactions in a seamless 
environment. The user is said to federate otherwise isolated account.
41
 
 
Figure 12. Federation of Local Identities. Adapted from Liberty ID-FF 
Architecture Overview (2009) 
 As illustrated in Figure 12, ID-FF provides for two types of user experience: identity federation and single sign on 
(SSO). SSO builds on identity federation and provides a relatively easy to use interface. Based on the ID-FF 
framework, the user logs into a website (an airline in this example) and is asked if they want to federate their airline 
identity with any other identity that they may have in the airline’s circle. Upon consent, the identities are federated. 
SSO is a simplification of the federation concept. A common example is the use of portal websites such as 
Travelocity.com (Section VII). Once the user is logged into the portal and is authenticated, the user is considered a 
trusted entity. In each subsequent transaction, the user is authenticated and her attributes are available to the 
service provider. This approach eliminates some of the issues discussed earlier in the tutorial such as password 
overload. ID-FF also provides for a de-federation function, that is, the termination of a federation. ID-FF uses HTML, 
SOAP, and JavaScript to exchange messages between SP and IdP. 
                                                     
40. http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/resource_center/specifications (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
41. http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_ff_1_2_specifications. 
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ID-WSF
42
 
In addition to ID-FF, the Liberty Alliance project defines the Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Identity 
Services Interface Specifications (ID-SIS). ID-WSF v. 2.0 was announced in October 2006
43
 and was built on ID-FF 
to support the secure and seamless development and use of web services and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). 
An additional function, Liberty People Service (LPS), provides user-centric web services protocol and was 
developed to support users’ access to web-based social networks (i.e., Web 2.0). 
The standard includes the following functions: authentication of web service consumers (WSC), message protection, 
privacy protection, service discovery, and user interaction to obtain consents. ID-WSF was designed to work with 
SAML 2.0. The specification extends the concept of an IdP to define a Trusted Module (TM), which is a software 
module allocated to a device and is trusted. ID-WSF allows two modes: federated transactions, which establish 
identity relationships with the service or web service provider, and SSO transactions. An SSO may be self-asserted 
where the TM acts as its own IdP; facilitated where the TM facilitates the authentication of the user via a proxy 
(rarely used since it does not use the full capabilities of the TM), or delegated where the IdP assigns some of the 
single sign-on process to the TM. 
ID-SIS 
ID-SIS specifications are used to define an identity-based web service that maintains, and provides identity data 
regarding a user (i.e., user’s profile). Returning to the Travelocity example, a profile would be a user’s name, 
address, travel preferences, alerts’ request, and preferred payment information. ID-SIS Employee specifications are 
used to define similar functionality in the workplace. An example would be an employee’s directory entry with phone 
extension, office number, and mailbox number. 
An extension of ID-SIS is the Geolocation Service (ID-SIS-GL), which provides the geolocation of a principal (a 
person or an object) while in motion. Some of the data provided are the geographic coordinates, direction of travel, 
and speed. Such services can be used to locate and/or follow an entity. The ID-SIS specifications include 
extensions, which enable developers (or specific implementation) to add attributes that are not defined in the original 
specifications. These extensions provide flexibility for various implementations. 
The Liberty Alliance framework assumes the existence of a network of distributed servers that maintain users’ 
attributes and policies. This framework might not work well for mobile, ad-hoc, and peer-to-peer architectures. In 
addition, users cannot federate identities that are not in the ―circle.‖ The concept of ―circle of trust‖ also assumes that 
all participants are trustworthy. The latter could pose a problem if some organizations operate under different laws or 
regulatory frameworks (see further discussion in Section VIII). 
WS-* Specifications
44
 
WS-* denotes an identity management framework based on web services architecture.
45
 The standard enables 
secure communication between organizational systems using basic web-services messaging. Web services are the 
current de facto standard for business-to-business communications. The WS-* framework enables developers of 
web services to federate identities, thus authenticate service requests across domains (and organizational systems) 
regardless of the policies of each domain or their format. 
The Web Services Federation (WS-Federation) is a mechanism that allows divergent businesses to share user and 
computer systems securely through identity authentication and authorization. WS-federation policies provide a basic 
trust model between identity providers and dependent parties through WS-Security, WS-Trust, and WS-Security 
Policy. The standard is based on the concept of a token but does not restrict users to a given token structure or 
format. WS-Federation allows access from web clients using HTTP or from web-services clients directly. Claims (or 
assertions) about the entity requesting the service (the requestor) are codified into a token. WS-Trust is the 
component that defines the Security Token Service (STS) and the protocol used to request or issue the token. WS-
SecurityPolicy describes the STS and its associated claims. 
                                                     
42. http://iiw.idcommons.net/Liberty_Alliance_ID-WSF (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
43. http://xml.coverpages.org/LibertyID-WSFv20.html (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
44. http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/specification/ws-fed/ (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
45. http://xml.coverpages.org/WS-FederationDemo.html (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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       Figure 13. Example Request Security Token (RST) message
46 
 
WS-Security is a communications protocol enabling the application of security to web services. The standard 
provides the integration of security aspects by permitting and brokering trust of identities, attributes, and 
authentication of web services users. WS-SecurityPolicy is a specification that allows web services to use XML to 
describe and advertise their policies and for web service consumers to specify their policy requirements. It is a W3C 
recommendation. WS-Trust is the protocol used for requesting, issuing, renewing, canceling, and validating security 
tokens.
47
 Each entity has its own policies which define their STS and associated claims. WS-Trust is implemented in 
web services (proprietary or open source) provided by companies such as Microsoft and Sun Microsystems. The 
process begins by the requestor identifying a service it would like to access. Subsequently, the requestor inquires as 
to the level of security needed to access the service (using WS-SecurityPolicy). If the requestor does not have the 
appropriate level of security, it can request one from the STS. The STS issues an identity token and associated 
claims for the requestor (based on eligibility). The relying party
48
 (or SP) accesses the STS to validate the 
requestor’s token and claims. Figure 13 provides sample code illustrating a token request message. 
WS-Federation and its subcomponents were jointly developed by a consortium of companies (i.e., BEA Systems, 
BMC Software, CA Inc., IBM, Layer 7 Technologies, Microsoft, Novell, and VeriSign). WS-security was initially 
developed by IBM, Microsoft, and VeriSign and was adopted by OASIS in 2007. One of the advantages of WS-
Federation is that it can be used directly by Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) clients and web services. WS-
Trust protocol and WS-Federation extensions are expressed in a browser-based location (client based). This 
provides federated identity operations a universal model for web services and browser-based applications. Unlike 
server-based standards, browser-based are portable and can be implemented on mobile devices and in peer-to-
peer applications where the concept of a stable server does not exist. 
ITU-T Standards 
X. 509
49
 
X.509 is an ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) standard developed based on the concept of 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). X.509 certificates are supported by most current security protocols such as Secure 
Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), IPSec (Internet Protocol security), and Secure Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). A trusted third party, the certification authority (CA) issues a certificate to be 
                                                     
46. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb498017.aspx (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
47. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-Trust (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
48. The term relying party, relying entity or relying service is often used to describe the service provider (SP), since these entities rely on the 
authentication process. 
 
<s:Envelope> 
  <s:Header> 
    <wsa:Action> 
      http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/Issue 
    </wsa:Action> 
    <!-- Other headers not shown for brevity --> 
  </s:Header> 
  <s:Body> 
    <wst:RequestSecurityToken> 
      <wst:TokenType> 
        http://example.org/mySpecialToken 
      </wst:TokenType> 
      <wst:RequestType> 
        http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue 
      </wst:RequestType> 
    </wst:RequestSecurityToken> 
  </s:Body> 
</s:Envelope> 
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used by a particular business (or entity). The certificate is unique to the business and thus can authenticate any 
message it sends. 
X.509 maintains certificates in a ―tree like‖ structure. The attributes (or the level of trustworthiness) of the root 
certificate are inherent in subsequent (son) certificates. Authenticity and authority of the certificate are dependent on 
the origin or ―root‖ certificate, which is trusted.
50
 An example of a ―root‖ certificate is a certificate used by a web 
browser to verify users’ identity within SSL or TSL secure connections. The certificate must pass through the 
certification revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a list of serial numbers of certificates that have been rejected or are no 
longer in use.
51
 This enables the automatic revocation of rights. 
 
Figure 14. From Silo to User Centric Approach to Identity Management. 
Adapted from Cho [2006] 
 
Digital ID wallet
52
 
Digital ID wallet is an ITU-T international standard (Self-Control Strengthening-Type Digital Identity Sharing 
Framework) developed initially by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) in South 
Korea. The digital ID wallet is essentially a web-based cyber wallet that serves as storage for data such as 
addresses, telephone numbers, user’s ID, and passwords. The underlying philosophy of the standard is to move 
beyond the concept of federated identity and develop user-centric IdMS. 
Figure 14 illustrates the conceptual progression from the initial silo approach through centralized (e.g., Microsoft’s 
Passport), and federated to user-centric. 
One of the challenges with federated identities is the need for interoperability between various providers who often 
have differing policies and architecture. The larger the number of providers involved, the more complex the 
federation. Although consortia like Liberty and OASIS membership span a variety of industries and countries, they 
are not universal. Using federated identities, users are forced to use member websites or services (or websites that 
are part of the ―circle of trust‖), reducing flexibility especially for users in less compliant countries. Furthermore, 
federated identities shift the control from the user to the service and identity providers. The Digital ID wallet standard 
attempts to address these challenges. A key attribute of the ID wallet is that the key is generated using the user’s id 
and not a Certification Authority. This approach is independent of the existence of a Certification Authority and is 
well-suited to support mobile and ad hoc communication. 
The system automatically creates a secure secret key for each web site, which is stored in a client-based digital 
wallet. Thus, it is not necessary for users to memorize individual passwords. The Digital ID wallet enables the user 
to register and log onto a website, store personal information, and other data at any time. Users can use the Digital 
ID wallet to pay for online purchases. The Digital ID wallet is based on mutual authentication technology, which 
                                                     
49. http://www.tech-faq.com/x.509.shtml (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
51. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_revocation_list (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
52. http://english.hellodd.com/jinny_board/board/chk_content.asp?table=newpro_board&idx=8 (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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protects users' information from phishing and farming attacks. Jung et al. [2007] proposed a framework for the 
implementation of a mobile Digital Id wallet. The key challenge in the development of a mobile ID wallet is that user 
information resides in a Universal Subscribers Identity Module (USIM) and not with a Service Provider. M-commerce 
is highly developed in Asian countries such as Japan and Korea and thus requires advanced security features. In 
addition, ―the mobile Digital ID wallet provides related services that perform sharing and managing of personal and 
certification information‖ [Jung et al. 2007, p. 1]. 
The main advantage of the standard is that it is client-based and can be applied to a variety of websites, policies, 
and architectures. The biggest challenge for the implementation of the Digital ID wallet is its dependence on the 
casual end-user. Users should be aware of the possibilities and obstacles of the standard and versed in proper 
definitions and use of the digital wallet. 
XI. VENDOR IMPLEMENTATIONS 
The IdMS Market 
According to IDC, the market of IdMS technology is likely to increase to $5.1 billion by 2010 [Kho 2009]. A Forrester 
report estimates the market will reach $12.3 billion by the year 2014 [Cser and Penn 2008]. These figures include 
revenues from software and implementation services [Cser and Penn 2008]. Overall, the security vendors’ market is 
expanding rather than converging (as often is expected from a maturing market). Based on Forrester, 17 percent of 
the new vendors’ offerings announced in 2007 were related to Identity and Access management. Within the IdMS 
market, provisioning licensing and services account for 50 percent of the revenue and is expected to grow by 
approximately 25 percent. By 2014, provisioning is expected to account for 64 percent of the IdMS market. SSO 
(enterprise and web) are expected to grow by 28.5 percent and 6.9 percent respectively. Sixty-seven percent of 
implementations are in North America, 26 percent in Europe and 6 percent in Asia Pacific. Cost and complexity are 
publicized as the main reasons companies delay the implementation of IdMS solutions. 
As of Feburary 2008, Forrester listed approximately thirty companies, specializing in eight services, from enterprise 
SSO (e-SSO) to provisioning, entitlement management, and identity audits [Cser and Penn 2008]. The number of 
vendors that offer a suite of solutions is relatively small, and the solutions are partial at best. Cser and Penn’s [2008] 
study also analyzed eleven leading IdMS vendors to find that none offers all the potential services. Out of the eight 
services listed, IBM, Novell, and Oracle are leading with six full services and one partial, followed by Sun with six 
services and Computer Associates with five full services and two partial. The remaining vendors offer anywhere from 
three to four services. 
This market fragmentation and specialization is slowing down adoption. Presently, companies are forced to 
implement fragmented solutions from a variety of vendors, increasing complexity and cost. For example, all eleven 
major vendors offer provisioning services, while only three of the vendors offer virtual directories. In June 2008, 
Forrester published an analysis of fourteen IdMS related technologies [Cser 2008]. Estimated implementation costs 
of these services vary widely, from $30,000–$50,000 for services such as password management to $500,000–
$630,000 for services such as provisioning and role management. 
Vendors’ Offerings 
Overall, the market of IdMS includes some integrated solutions from large IT companies such as IBM, Oracle, Sun, 
and Microsoft. For example, Microsoft is attempting to secure ―cloud‖ services using WS-based identity management 
solutions within its web-services offerings. In addition, the market includes IT security ―mega-vendors‖ such as 
Checkpoint Software, McAfee, and Symantec, and a large number of small companies offering one or more 
specialized, innovative services. Although the frameworks and standards discussed in this tutorial  are slowly 
attempting to converge around an open source, federated, XML based approach to IdM, the technologies and 
services available to companies are highly fragmented, leading to costly and complex implementations. 
IBM
53
 
IBM markets its solution under the Tivoli® Identity Manager (ITIM) trademark. IBM’s website claims that ITIM is a 
tool, which enables automated, policy-based user management. The package supports an e-SSO and a Web SSO, 
strong authentication capabilities, role-based, group or request-based provisioning, and most open standards and 
specifications such as SAML, Liberty Alliance ID-FF, and WS-Security specifications such as WS-*
54
. Tivoli includes 
the following features [IBM 2007]: 
                                                     
53. http://www-01.ibm.com/software/tivoli/ (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
54. http://www.nasi.com/tivoli_identity-management.php (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
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1. Automated user management throughout the entire user’s life cycle. 
2. Policy driven IdM, audit trails and reports to support organizational compliance with regulations such as SOX. 
Any change to the system that does not comply with organizational or regulatory policies cannot be 
implemented. 
3. Web-based user support to reduce reliance on helpdesk. 
4. Support of millions of users with relatively little performance or availability concerns. 
5. A large set of functions for ―out-of-the-box‖ use and customization capabilities. These functions are J2EE 
based and support IBM and Microsoft environments. 
6. Simulation capabilities that enable the organization to evaluate a policy change and its potential unintended 
consequences prior to implementation. 
ITIM mostly supports IBM or Microsoft architecture, limiting its implementation to organizations that use one of these 
two architectures. For example, transactions are stored in only one of three common proprietary databases (i.e., 
Oracle, DB2, or SQL Server). ITIM supports users and services as entities. 
SUN Microsystems55 
Sun Microsystems (Sun) markets their identity management software under the trademark Identity Manager 8.0 
(SIM). The product supports role based provisioning and life cycle management. SIM provides audit trails, and 
enables the export of generated data to other repositories for further analysis and reporting. Similar to ITIM, SIM is 
policy driven and is geared to enhance compliance with external regulations. SIM reports 99.9 percent uptime and 
scalability of up to millions of users with limited reduction in performance.
56
 SIM is compatible with SPML 2.0 and 
operates in more environments than ITIM (e.g., Sun Solaris, Red Hat Linux, HP OpenVMS, HP-UX, IBM AIX, IBM 
OS/400, Microsoft Windows, SuSE Enterprise Linux) and supports a larger number of databases and enterprise 
applications than ITIM. 
Novell57 
Novell identity manager (IDM) is part of a suite of access and security control products offered by Novell Inc. It 
includes similar features to the ITIM by IBM and the SIM by Sun. However, it supports a larger variety of 
architectures (e.g., operating systems, database, enterprise software, and messaging) than the other two packages. 
Most systems are supported ―out-of-the-box‖ while some need customization. IDM is XML based and offers user-
friendly interface, self-management, testing, and policy based management. Although Novell IDM was one of eight 
vendors approved by Liberty Alliance as SAML compliant, it was not possible to find compliance or standard related 
information on Novell’s website. While Sun emphasis its compliance with a large number of open source standards, 
Novell does not. 
Shibboleth58 
Shibboleth is a semi-commercial endeavor developed in the United Kingdom by the Joint Information Systems 
Committee (JISC) to support federated identity management across all educational institutions. Shibboleth is a 
SAML based product and was developed for use over Internet II. Access control is based on a set of attributes 
provided by an IdP and a set of rules defined by an SP. If a user’s attributes match the SP’s rules, the user is 
granted access. The basic premise is the existence of a countrywide (currently implemented in the U.K.) ―circle of 
trust‖ where institutions trust the information provided by others in the circle. The goal of the project is to have 
anyone (students, professor, administrators, and researchers) involved in UK’s educational system (elementary 
school to higher education) enrolled in Shibboleth, to facilitate ease of access to educational resources and resource 
sharing. Additional information can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shibboleth (Internet2) and at  
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/themes/accessmanagement/federation/animation. 
                                                     
55. http://www.sun.com/software/products/identity_mgr/index.xml (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
56. http://www.sun.com/software/products/identity_mgr/features.xml (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
57. http://www.novell.com/rc/docrepository/public/16/basedocument.2007-03-13.3695433449/4641008_en.pdf (last accessed 08/16/2009). 
58. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shibboleth. 
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XII. CONCLUSIONS 
We began the tutorial by describing several conceptual frameworks for the implementation of IdM systems and 
concluded by detailing current standards and vendors’ implementations. The tutorial also introduced social and 
technical challenges that need to be resolved. 
Although we are seeing some progress in the development of universally accepted frameworks and technologies for 
the management of cyber identities, much work remains. The various paradigms and implementations need to 
converge. At present, we are seeing two different approaches to IdMS. One is based on a circle of trust, which 
enables transparent IdMS for users within the circle. This approach creates islands that are not interoperable, limit 
accessibility outside of the circle, and possibly leading to an increase divide between organizations in compliant 
countries and nonparticipating countries. This federated approach relies on trusted and managed identity and 
service providers. These providers could become an attractive target for hackers. 
The user-centric approach enables users to access any website at any time and any place. However, it depends on 
users’ ability to manage their identities, policies, and privacy, a task that requires awareness and training. Designers 
of user-centric systems need to create user-friendly interfaces and a transparent environment. Resolving these 
issues also depends on the development of globally accepted policies. Much like our presently universal telephone 
system, which heavily depends on a universal infrastructure, cost structure, and operational policies, a universal 
implementation of an IdMS requires global acceptance. 
As we move on to a society based on the ―Internet of things‖ or ambient intelligence, security will become more 
complex. Identities will extend beyond people, organizations, and services to everything. For example, it is possible 
that as you leave the house in the morning, your smart shoe will send a service request to weather.com, which in 
turn will ask for a geolocation from your shoe. If weather.com predicts a warm day, air vents will open to create 
airflow to your shoe. Similar scenarios might exist with your smart clothing, home, and car. It is up to each individual 
user to determine how much information each of these items is allowed to send, how often, when, and to which 
service. Such scenarios could result in privacy issues that need to be resolved such as how long the requested 
information is to remain with the service provider and what the provider can use it for. 
Finally, globalization depends on our ability to develop a universal IdMS. However, jurisdictional issues, legal and 
cultural differences might slow the progress of such endeavors. Although these are pertinent and interesting topics, 
they are beyond the scope of this tutorial. 
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APPENDIX A: AN EXAMPLE OF THREE APPLICATIONS AND THEIR UNIQUE DIGITAL 
IDENTITY NEEDS 
Each of the following three domains represents some unique characteristics in the context of IdM that are interesting 
to explore: healthcare, e-Government, and e-learning. 
Health Care 
Identity management in the healthcare industry has been at the forefront of recent IdMS studies. The Health 
Information Privacy Act (HIPAA) was the first attempt to legislate industry specific information assets. Although 
HIPAA was originated in the U.S, its essence is universal as many countries adopted similar measures to protect the 
dissemination of medical information and patient privacy. In addition to being regulated, Healthcare Information 
Systems (HIS) are unique since: 
1. A large number of stakeholders require access to a patient’s information (doctors, nurses, lab technicians, 
billing clerks, and the patients themselves). 
2. The information is created in various locations (doctor’s office, a laboratory, a pharmacy). 
3. The stakeholders are not co-located and, therefore, require remote access. 
4. The stakeholders belong to various organizations, with various computing capabilities, security levels, and 
architecture, making integration difficult. Furthermore, some large medical providers (such as Kaiser 
Permanente) make their personal records available to individual patients from their home computers. 
5. Due to the nature of their work, stakeholders (e.g., physician, specialists), require continuous and multiple 
access to patient records. For example, a physician might check a medical record in her office, using a 
desktop computer, before visiting a patient’s bed. During rounds, the physician wants to re-evaluate the 
records and might also need to examine x-rays and lab results on a mobile device. Any IdMS should allow 
users the ability to toggle between applications and patients with minimum time and effort. 
6. Time is of the essence. Occasionally a timely medical treatment is crucial and more important than privacy or 
policies. A healthcare related IdMS should take into consideration the occasional emergencies and enable 
exceptions. 
e-Learning 
Unlike Healthcare Information Systems, securing e-learning is voluntary and not regulated. Universities implement e-
learning as a competitive advantage, a marketing tool, and to attract non-traditional students (working adults, 
military, foreign). For the most part, the information exchanged is not sensitive with the exception of some 
administrative systems (grades, transcripts and matriculation). In addition, university security requirements are lower 
than most other industries (mostly due to the concept of academic freedom). E-learning has the following unique 
characteristics (http://celsr.nova.edu/): 
1. Some internal stakeholders have a stake in sharing their identities rather than following policies, whereas in 
most other organizations, internal users might share identities mostly by mistake. 
2. Students could have someone else take a remote examination, submit an assignment, or participate in online 
chat for them. 
3. The amount of face-to-face communication is relatively low. 
4. Stakeholders are transient. Unlike other organizations, students spend only a fraction of their career at school. 
This is especially true with remote students who are working and have other scheduling obligations. 
Therefore, their level of loyalty to the organization (school) is relatively low compared with a traditional worker. 
5. The goal of the university and the students conflict: The university wants to administer controlled education; 
degrees are conferred on successful candidates. The student wants to gain a degree. Thus, traditional 
identification control measures and mechanisms do not work well in e-learning environments  
In short, Universities offering e-learning, unlike most traditional organizations, are defending against internal, 
intentional misuse by transient stakeholders with minimal organizational ties and loyalty. 
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e-Government 
E-government systems offer a variety of services to citizens of a country (limited in reach). Most early systems were 
informational only and, therefore, did not pose security threats. However, over time these systems became more 
interactive (e.g., tax filing, automobile registration). E-government systems, if not well protected, enable hackers’ 
access to sensitive information. E-government systems should have the following characteristics.
59
 
1. Open to all citizens, yet protected from ―unwanted entities‖ 
2. Highly protected to prevent identity theft 
3. Unauthorized access to certain systems can result in cyber terrorism. 
4. In democratic societies, access control to these systems should be regulated by the legislators rather than 
mandated by government (executive branch). 
5. Any access control implemented has to maintain user privacy. 
Some of these requirements are conflicting. For example, how does one open a system to its citizens yet close it to 
its enemies? The Internet transcends national boundaries, and, once a system is placed in cyberspace, it is 
accessible to all. Similarly, the balance between a strong identity and privacy is delicate and a sensitive issue, 
especially when governments are involved. 
APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF THE TWO EXISTING IDMS PARADIGMS 
Table B-1 compares the two main existing IdMS paradigms. The digital Identity assumes that each entity carries its 
credentials on the client and manages them like a key. A key provides access to certain sites based on the entity’s 
credentials. The federated paradigm assumes a circle of trust, once an entity is allowed into the circle, it can use all 
the assets allocated to it. 
Table B-1. Comparison of Two Paradigms 
 
 Token Federated 
Standard ITU-T Liberty/OASIS 
Paradigm User centric Circle of trust 
Implementation Client based 
Digital identity/key 
Third party based 
Certificate 
Advantages User control 
Supports mobile and peer-to-peer 
communication 
Third party audit ability and accountability 
Challenges  User training and awareness 
 More difficult to maintain the ―safety‖ of 
the key 
 Who is authorized to issue a key? How is 
this entity being regulated?  
 Who is ―in‖ the circle? 
 Maintaining the integrity of the circle 
 Less effective for ad-hoc communication 
Companies Microsoft; ETRI IBM, SUN 
 
                                                     
59. Partially based on a report by the national science and technology council subcommittee on biometrics and identity management published in 
September 2008. 
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APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY 
Action: The type of access that is being requested (for example, read, write, create, delete, logged). 
Attribute: A specific characteristic of a subject, resource, action, or environment in which the access request is 
made. Attributes could include a user’s name, workstation identity, security clearance, the file to which access 
is desired and the time of day. 
Bag: An unordered collection of attributes, used for matching attributes to conditions. Bags may contain duplicate 
attributes or be empty. 
Certificate authority or certification authority (CA): An entity that issues digital certificates for use by other 
parties. It is an example of a trusted third party. CAs are characteristic of many public key infrastructure (PKI) 
schemes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certification_authority). 
Certification path validation algorithm: The algorithm which verifies that a given certificate path is valid under a 
given public key infrastructure (PKI) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certification_path_validation_algorithm). 
Directory Services: The software system that stores, organizes, and provides access to the information in a 
directory. 
Federation: A collection of security domains that have established relationships for sharing resources in a secure 
manner. 
Identity provider or OpenID provider: A service provider offering the service of registering, and authenticating an 
id.  
Liveliness: Validating liveliness is part of the ID-FF framework. Its goal is to ensure that the person performing an 
activity at time t+1 is the same person that was authenticated and federated at time t. 
Policy: A single access-control policy expressed through a set of rules. 
Policy Set: A container of policies, including references to remote policies. 
Provisioning: The process of preparing and equipping a network so that it can provide (new) services to its users 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_provisioning). 
Pseudonymity: Derived from pseudonym, meaning false name, and anonymity, meaning unknown or undeclared 
source. The pseudonym identifies a holder, that is, a human being, a service, or a machine that possesses but 
do not disclose their true identity. 
Public key certificate (or identity certificate): An electronic document which uses a digital signature to bind 
together a public key with an identity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate). 
Replay attack: A form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or 
delayed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack). 
Resource: A device, data element or file for which access is requested. 
Revocation: The automated removal of privileges, assertions, or credentials of an entity. 
Root certificate: Either an unsigned public key certificate or a self-signed certificate that identifies the Root 
Certificate Authority (CA). A root certificate is part of a public key infrastructure scheme (http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Root_certificate). 
Service provider (SP): An entity that provides services to other entities. Usually this refers to a business that 
provides subscription or web service to other businesses or individuals (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Service_Provider). SP are also referred to as relying party. 
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Single sign-on (SSO): A property of access control of multiple, related, but independent software systems. With this 
property, a user logs in once and gains access to all systems without being prompted to log in again at each of 
them (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Sign-On). 
Subject: The person, computer, or service making a request; also known as an entity or the requestor. 
Target: A set of simplified conditions for the subject, resource, and action that must be met for a policy set, policy, or 
rule to apply to a given request. 
Trusted third party (TTP): An entity which facilitates interactions between two parties who both trust the third party; 
they use this trust to secure their own interactions. For example, a certificate authority (CA) (http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_third_party). 
WS-Federation: An Identity Federation specification, developed by BEA Systems, BMC Software, CA, Inc., IBM, 
Layer 7 Technologies, Microsoft, Novell, Ping Identity, and VeriSign (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-
Federation). 
WS-Policy: A specification that allows web services to use XML to advertise their policies (on security, Quality of 
Service, etc.) and for web service consumers to specify their policy requirements (http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/WS-Policy). 
WS-Security (Web Services Security): A communications protocol providing a means for applying security to web 
services. On April 19 2004 the WS-Security 1.0 standard was released by Oasis-Open (http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-Security). 
WS-SecurityPolicy: A web services specification, created by IBM and 12 co-authors, which deals with defining 
"policy assertions" which are utilized by the WS-Security, WS-Trust, and WS-SecureConversation 
specifications (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-SecurityPolicy). 
WS-Trust: A WS specification and OASIS standard that provides extensions to WS-Security, specifically dealing 
with the issuing, renewing, and validating of security tokens, as well as with ways to establish, assess the 
presence of, and broker trust relationships between participants in a secure message exchange (http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-Trust). 
APPENDIX D: ABBREVIATIONS 
AAP—Alternative Approval Process 
ACL—Access Control Lists 
BDT—Telecommunication Development Bureau 
BR—Radiocommunication Bureau 
CA—certification authority  
CCIR—International Radio Consultative Committee 
CCITT—International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee 
CPU—central processing unit 
CRL—certification revocation list 
CU—control unit 
DNS—Domain Name System 
DSML—Directory Service Markup Language 
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e-SSO—enterprise Single Sign-On 
ETRI—Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute  
FGs—focus groups 
HIPAA—Health Information Privacy Act 
HIS—Healthcare Information systems 
HTML—Hypertext Markup Language 
HTTP—hypertext protocol 
ID-FF—Identity Federation Framework 
ID-SIS—Service Interface Specifications 
ID-SIS-GL—Service Interface Specifications Geolocation Service 
ID-WSF—Identity Web Services Framework 
IDC—Interactive Data Corp 
IDM—Novell identity manager  
IdM—Identity Management 
IdMS—Identity Management Systems  
IdP—identity provider 
IETF—Internet Engineering Task Force 
IMS—information management systems 
IOS—Inter-organizational systems 
IP—internet protocol 
IPSec—Internet Protocol security 
ISO—International Organization for standardization 
ITIM—Tivoli® Identity Manager 
ITU—International Telecommunication Union 
ITU-D—Telecommunication Development Sector 
ITU-R—Radiocommunication Sector 
ITU-T—ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector  
JISC—Joint Information Systems Committee  
LAN—local area networks  
LPS—Liberty People Service 
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MIT—Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
OASIS—Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
PDA—personal digital assistant 
PDP—Policy Decision Point 
PEP—Policy Enforcement Point 
PKI—Public Key Infrastructure 
PSP—provisioning service point 
PST—provisioning service target 
RA—requesting authority 
RACF—Resource Access Control Facility 
SAML—Security Assertion Markup Language 
SDOs—standards developing organizations 
SGs—study groups 
SGML—Standard Generalized Markup Language 
SIM—Sun Identity Manager 
SOA—Service Oriented Architecture 
SOAP—Simple Object Access Protocol 
SOX—Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
SP—Service provider 
SSO—Single Sign-On 
SPML—Service Provisioning Markup Language 
STS—Security Token Service  
TLS—Transport Layer Security 
TM—Trusted Module 
TSB—Telecommunication Standardization Bureau 
S/MIME—Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension 
SAML—Security Assertion Makeup Language  
SIGs—special interest groups 
SPML—Service Provisioning Markup Language  
SSL—Secure Socket Layer 
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TLS—Transport Layer Security 
USIM—Universal Subscribers Identity Module 
WS—Web Services 
WS-Federation—Web Services Federation 
WS-Policy—Web Services Policy 
WS-Security—Web Services Security 
WS-Trust—Web Services Trust 
WSC—web service consumers 
XACML—Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
XML—Extensible Markup Language 
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